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Strategic trade policy  focuses  on  the use of policy instruments such as  tariffs, 
subsidies,  or  quotas  towards import and/or export competing industries.  One 
has  learnt from  these models  that trade policy  is  sensitive to the assumptions 
on the patterns of trading and that the optimal policy can vary depending on 
the different  mix of the \'arious  policy instruments that one considers.  This is 
precisely the argument that has stinmlated a  generous research effort in imper-
fectly competitive markets where governments can use trade policy instruments 
unilaterally, or bilaterally, to their advantage
l  and sometimes policy instruments 
are adopted even though they may be jointly suboptima12 .  Besides the use  of 
trade policy tools to study the profit shifting motive the use of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties is  analyzed by  Dixit  (1988).  The trade policy equilibrium 
implies positive subsidies and t.ariffs.  The domestic government can attain the 
first best outcome by using a  tariff on imports and a  subsidy towards domestic 
production to eliminate the oligopoly distortion and to shift rents to the domestic 
firm.  If the  go\'(~rnment. is  restricted to use only  tariffs  then the (second-best) 
optimal tariff exceeds its fully opt.imal val11e. 3 
Subsequent research  on  trade policy  instruments  has  focussed  attention on 
the time consistency of policies.  That is,  whether prior commitment to a  policy 
may  lead to an ex-post.  suh-optimal choice of the strategic variable on the part 
of firms.  The principal contribution of this literatnre is that optimal trade policy 
instrnments are sensitive to the timing of policy moves  (sec,  Carmichae14  (1987) 
and GoldbergS  (1995))  and that credible policies are generally welfare improving 
113mnder and Spencer (198-1)  sho\\'ed that an activist gm'ernment can use tariffs as a welfare 
imprm'ing policy tool in an imperfectly compctiti\'e market. 
'213rander and Spencer (1985) using a third-market model, show that the noncoperative equi-
librium is  characterized by positive production susbsidies for both the exporting coutries.  Joint 
welfare of the producing nations \\"ould  rise if the subsidy le\'els were reduced by both govern-
ments.  Further Eaton and Grossman (1986)  show that the choice of the policy variable may be 
sensitive to whether firms  compete in prices or quantities.  Contrary to Brander and Spencer 
(1985)  they show that under Bertrand competition the optimal policy is  in fact a tax. 
3 Also see Collie (1991).  J'\ote, unlike Dixit we  do not consider multiple instruments. 
~ In a  third market model Carmicbael shows that governments perfectly offset stage 1 price 
increases by the domestic finn with higher subsidies  (~~ =  1,where p  is  the price and  5  the 
subsidy). 
5Goldberg has shown that precommitment to a policy on the part of the government is  not 
necessary if a home firm invests in capacity.  Im'esting in capacity works as a signal for the home 
1 (see,  Leahy and Neary6  (1994,  1996,  1999),  Neary (1999),  Staiger and Tabellini 
(1988)). 
All the above papers limit themselves to using homogenous or horizontal prod-
uct differentiation models to study the issue of credibility on how trade policy 
varies, and its implication on welfare.  Little attention has been paid to strategic 
trade policy in vertically differentiated industries.  This is surprising given the ev-
idence that trade volume has been increasing inside trading blocks and that intra 
industry trade characterized by different levels of quality is  in fact a  significant 
proportion of trade (see,  Greenaway, Hine and Millner (1994)  among others). 
Vertical product differentiation models incorporate firm decision in two stages. 
In the first stage the firm commits to a quality (bearing sunk costs at that stage) 
and in the second stage the firm competes in the market.  Commitment to quality 
reflects an important characteristic of oligopolistic markets, i.e., firms bear sunk 
costs of investing in a strategic variable prior to competing in the market stage. 
Moreover,  as  qualities  are endogenous  a  pure-strategy asymmetric equilibrium 
arises  whenever  consumers  have heterogenous  tastes on quality7  (in  the sense 
that, in a  duopolistic market,  a  single high-,  and low-,  quality firm emerges in 
equilibrium). 
The existence of asymmetric qualities raises  many interesting questions for 
trade policy.  For instance, now trade policy may not only be dependent on trade 
patterns and credibility (issues pointed out above), it may also depend on whether 
the active country's firm is of a high-, or low-, quality under free trade.  Depending 
upon the position on the quality ladder of an active country's firm, its government 
policy can now alter market outcomes in three ways.  That is,  government policy 
can not only influence the production plans and qualities of the firms, it can also 
change the market structure. 
In particular, a government can induce reversals in the quality configuration, or 
govenment  and as  a  result even the time consistent subsidy is  positive  (for  some parameter 
values) 
6By committing to a R&D subsidy a government induces a lower level of R&D expenditure 
for  the foreign firm  thus improving home welfare.  Thereby the domestic government is  able to 
avoid  the decrease in the market share of the home firm  in case that the foreign firm  invests 
more in R&D. 
7This is  a standard result in the literature on vertical differentiation, see e.g.  Motta (1993), 
Tirole (1989),  Shaked and Sutton (1982,  1983,  1984),  Sutton (1992)).  Note,  however,  that if 
consumers have homogeneous tastes then there is  a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium where 
both firms produce the same quality (see Eaton and Lipsey, 1989)). 
2 exit, of firms by choosing the appropriate tariff or subsidy.  These kinds of policies 
are also  a  part of the equilibrium  (time consistent)  policies that a  government 
has  at  its  disposal.  The profit  transfer  due to  such  policies  now  depends on 
whether the home firm  is  a high- or lo\\,- quality producer under free trade.  For 
example, taxing high quality imports results in greater rent transfers (a greater 
profit transfer + tariff revennes) than taxing a low quality good where no quality 
switching  takes  place  (and  the profit  transfer  is  of  a  much lower  magnitude). 
Further, due to the change in the relative quality positions, or exit, of the firms 
the resulting market structure will  now be different from what it was under free 
trade,  Quality switching and exit due to government policies are unique to the 
vertical product differentiation models and are not observed in horizontal product 
differentiation models. 
The role of trade policy in vertically differentiated industries becomes all the 
more important gin~n that trade policy instruments have short-, and long-, nm ef-
fects.  That is, uot only do trade policy instruments affect short nm variables, such 
as prices and quantities, they also affect long 1'1111 variables such as qllality8.  Thus, 
in addition to the fact that in om model the rent transfer effects are asymmetric, 
we  expect to see long run effects on \'ariables such as investment in quality. 
In this paper wc  study the imposition of import tariffs and domestic output 
subsidies in a  n:rtically differentiated industry when the government can/cannot 
credibly commit to Cl  level of tariff/subsidy.  A domestic and a foreign firm selling 
in the home market, first choose quality and then compete in quantities or prices9 . 
\\'e show that time consistent tariffs ensure that the domestic finn always produces 
the high  quality good.  \Yhcn the foreign  firm  produces the high quality good 
1luder free trade. it will switch qualities and start prod1lcing the low quality good 
instead.  This is  due to the fact that it.  knows that ex-post it faces  a  tariff that 
is  proportional to its quality (that is,  the tariff is  increasing in its own quality). 
SFor  a  discussion of the short- and  long- term view  of the rent  transfer effect,  and their 
discrepancies, in such markets see  Grossman (1988). 
9I\'ote,  in yertically  differentiated industries the rent transfer effects  can be very different 
between  the  import  competing and  the third-country(  export  competing)  models.  In  third-
country models go\'ernlllents cannot impose tariffs or quotas on competing countries and thus 
gm'ernment policies cannot pro\'oke leapfrogging.  Further, due to natural asymmetries in these 
models  (a high quality firm  has a  larger market share and makes significantly greater profits 
than a  lo\\'  quality firm)  governments ability to expand domestic firm  output and profit is  a 
function of whether they produce the lo\\"  or  high quality good.  Hence,  qualitatively the two 
models are not the same. 
3 Since investment in quality is  a sunk cost, the domestic government, by moving 
second,  can safely expropriate gross profits of the foreign  firm  by choosing the 
appropriate tariff.  Thus, time consistent tariffs completely alter the structure of 
the market for the case when the foreign firm is of high quality under free trade. 
Under non-credible tariffs domestic welfare is  higher than under precommitment 
(with the exception when the domestic firm  is  of high quality under free  trade 
and the firms  compete in prices).  Thus, lack of commitment on the part of the 
government could in itself be a policy tool in the framework of our model. 
Further, we present results on time consistent subsidies where we show that 
contrary to Goldberg (1995) the time consistent subsidy is always positive and re-
sults in domestic monopolies (as the foreign firm exits the market). This happens 
as the domestic firm knows that the subsidy it receives ex-post is increasing in the 
quality it chooses in the first stage.  Hence, if the government moves after the firms 
the foreign firm will not enter the market and the domestic firm will choose a high 
quality level  10 ,  selling to the entire domestic market at marginal cost.  Indepen-
dent of the mode of competition, or the equilibrium quality configuration under 
free trade, time consistent subsidies always alter the market structure.  Moreover, 
domestic welfare is zero under non-credible subsidies as government expenditures 
on subsidies are high enough so  that they offset  the increase in consumer sur-
plus.  Precommitment on the part of the domestic government thus always results 
in higher domestic welfare.  This result is  similar to Neary  (1991),  Leahy  and 
Neary (1994,  1996, 1999) and Staiger and Tabellini (1988)  where commitment to 
a subsidy increases domestic welfare.  Finally, unlike the policy reversal observed 
in Eaton and Grossman (1986)  our qnalitative results are invariant under price 
competition. 
In Section 2 we  present the benchmark free  trade vertical product differenti-
ation model under quantity competition with the equilibrium quality,  quantity, 
and welfare outcomes.  In Section 3 non-credibility and quality switching are stud-
ied when the government uses tariffs as a policy tool.  Both the cases where the 
foreign/domestic firm produces the high/low quality good, and vice-versa, under 
free trade are analyzed.  In Section 4 credible tariffs for the cases mentioned above 
and their welfare implication with, and without, precommitment are analyzed.  In 
section 5 we  analyze time consistent subsidies and their welfare implications on 
market structure and welfare.  In Section 6 we  briefly discuss the results under 
lOThis  result is  qualitatively similar to Carmichael where subsidy depends directly on the 
price chosen by the domestic firm. 
4 Bertrand competition.  Section 7 is  the conclusion. 
2.  The Basic Model 
The simple case of two countries, foreign and domestic is  considered.  There are 
two  firms,  one located in  each country and producing a  vertically differentiated 
good.  Firms first select the qllality of their goods and then compete in the market 
by  choosing  their  quantities.  Quality  is  endogenous  and we  denote by  SI  the 
higher quality,  and by  S2  the lower  quality offered in the market  (SI  ~ S2).  Vve 
concentrate on the effects of trade policies in the domestic market alone.  Trade 
policy can take the form of import tariffs or per-unit domestic output subsidies. 
There is  a contiml111l1  of consumers in the domestic market, each identified by his 
taste parameter 0,  where 0 is  ulliformly distributed over the interval  [0, e]  with 
density onc; e  t hen represents the size of the market.  A consumer 0 has a unitary 
demand for  the good and his utility function is, 
u = {  (OSi  -- p)  if he buys one unit of the good of quality Si  (2.1) 
o  otherwise. 
To  deri\'e the demand for  the low  and high quality good,  wc  first  define the 
taste  parameter of the consnmer  indifferent  between  buying the high,  or  low, 
quality good as  01'2  =  [~:=;~],  The consumer indifferent between buying the low 
quality good and not  buying at all  has the taste parameter 002  =;;-.  All  the 
consumers for whom e  ~  0 ~ 012  purchase good with quality SI and all consumers 
for  ,\·hom 012  ?  0 ?  002  pnrchase quality S2.  Those described by 0 <  002  do not 
lmy the good at all.  Hence the demands for  the high and low quality good are, 
(2.2) 
with the in\'erse demands, 
2 
Firmi's cost function is C(Si, xd = CXi + t,  where Xi represents its output and 
S7  the quality of its good.  The marginal cost of production, c, is constant and inde-
pendent of quality.  \Vithout loss of generality, we assume that marginal cost, c, is 
5 zero for both the domestic and the foreign firm.  Quality costs are fixed costs and 
there are decreasing returns to scale in quality improvement.  This specification 
captures the distinctive characteristics of (pure)  vertical product differentiation 
models.  Shaked and Sutton (1983)  define a purely vertically differentiated indus-
try as one where the costs of quality improvement fall  primarily on fixed  costs 
and involve only a modest, or no,  increase in unit variable costs.  Quality costs 
borne in the first stage are treated as sunk in the market competition stage (see 
Sutton, 1992). 
Vie consider two alternative scenarios.  In the first scenario, we let the govern-
ment set its trade policy in the first stage, acting as a Stackelberg leader towards 
the firms who decide on their strategic variables (acting as Stackelberg followers). 
The government either imposes a tariff on imports, or provides an output subsidy 
to the domestic firm.  In the second stage,  the domestic and the foreign  firm, 
taking the government's tariff/subsidy as given, select their qualities, bearing the 
cost of quality.  Finally, firms choose their outputs in the last stage. 
Note, that a time consistency problem arises in the scenario where the govern-
ment announces a policy before the firms  choose their strategic variables.  This 
happens as firm decisions on quality are long term (involving sunk costs for  the 
firms),  while the government policy tool applies on the firms'  outputs that can 
be adjusted in the short term.  An ex-ante optimal import tariff,  or domestic 
output subsidy, is not ex-post optimal after the firms have incurred the sunk cost 
of quality.  Therefore,  unless it possesses a  specific precommitment mechanism, 
the government has an incentive to modify its trade policy after the firms  have 
decided on their qualities.  Policy announcements in this scenario are justifiable 
only if the domestic government can credibly commit to an import tariff, or a per 
unit subsidy on domestic output, before firms invest in quality. 
However, if the government is  unable to precommit to a policy, the domestic 
and the foreign firm anticipate that the government will choose its ex-post optimal 
trade policy after the firms select their qualities.  In this second, time consistent 
scenario, firms select their qualities in the first stage anticipating the governmen-
t's optimal policy.  Contrary to the earlier scenario where the government acts as 
a  Stackelberg leader when selecting its trade policy,  in the time consistent sce-
nario the domestic and the foreign firm act as Stackelberg leaders selecting their 
qualities strategically to influence the government's choice of tariff/subsidy in the 
subsequent stage.  Needless to say, the domestic firm effectively has the first mover 
advantage, since one of the domestic government's objectives is to shift rents in 
6 favor of the domestic firm. 
\Ve analyze both the (credible) commitment and the time consistent scenario 
and we  compare their market and welfare outcomes with the benchmark case of 
free  trade.  In part.icular, wc  compare equilibrium qualities, outputs and market 
structures,  as  well  as consumer surplus and domestic welfare under time consis-
tent and precommitment import tariffs and domestic output subsidies with those 
under free trade.  As our focus is  on time consistency issues, the solution concept 
employed to solve for  the multi-stage strategic interaction bet\veen the domestic 
and the foreign finn, and t.he  government is  the subgame perfect equilibrium. 
2.1. Free Trade Equilibrium 
\Ve start the analysis by briefly presenting the outcome for  the benchmark case. 
Under free trade and choosing sinmltaneously, firms first select their qualities and 
then choose their quantities (for details see J\Iotta (1993)).  In the last stage, for 
any  given  pair of  qualities  (51,52),  firm  i  chooses  its quantity to maximize its 
2 
profits,  Pi(X;, Xj)Xi  - 82, giYell  the quantity of its ri\'al  Xj'  From the first  order 
cOllditions  (foe), \ve  get the equilibrillIl1 quantities, 
(2.4) 
and the equilibrium profits are,rr{T(Sl' 52)  = S;(x[T)2  - %. 
In the first stage, taking the qnality of its rival Sj as given, firm i chooses Si to 
maximize ,,[T(51' 52)'  Note that, as  a~fT < 0,  firm i has a strategic incentive to 
J 
OVerill\'est in quality in order to increase its market share in the subsequent stage, 
Setting A =  :':'  dividing the (two)  first  order conditions, and after some rnanip-
nlations we  get  the equilibrium qualities,  quantities,  profits and total domestic 
welfare under free trade: 
5fT = 0.251948:i  S~'T = 0.090228
2  8FT  = 0. 191e:i 
xfT = .45088  xfT = .27468  C SFT  = 0.040178
4 
"iT = 0.01946(t  "fT = 0.OO273(t  T1V[t = 0.04290(t 
TH!~T = O.05964t 
where,8 =  Xl~:  ~~~S2, is the average quality in the market and T1Vfh (TiVf /)  is the 
7 domestic welfarell when the foreign firm produces the high (low) quality good and 
the domestic firm the low  (high) quality good.  Note that under free trade, there 
are two  asymmetric pure strategy equilibria where one firm  is  the high quality 
producer and the other the low  quality producer.12  Domestic firm's profits,  as 
well as domestic welfare, are higher in the equilibrium where the domestic firm is 
the high quality producer. 
3. Optimal Time  Consistent  Tariffs  and  Reversals  in  the 
Quality Ladder 
Consider the case where the government's trade policy tool is an import tariff on 
the foreign firm.  Vie analyze the case where the government is unable to credibly 
commit to a tariff and compare equilibrium qualities, quantities, market structure 
and domestic welfare under time consistent tariffs with those under free trade.  In 
the next section we treat the traditional scenario where the government possesses 
a mechanism to commit to an import tariff and compare its equilibrium outcome 
and welfare with those under time consistent tariffs. 
As mentioned above, there are two equilibria under free trade:  (i)  foreign firm 
of high quality and domestic firm of low quality and (ii)  vice versa.  We consider 
each of these cases separately.  Interestingly, under optimal time consistent tariffs, 
the foreign  firm  producing high quality cannot be sustained in equilibrium.  In 
the unique equilibrium of the game, the domestic firm always produces the high 
quality good.  Thus, a (under free trade) high quality foreign firm facing an import 
tariff from a non-committal government will switch positions in the quality ladder 
and produce the low  quality good instead.  The reason is  quite simple.  If the 
foreign  firm selects a  high level of quality in the first  stage (thUS  incurring the 
sunk costs of quality)  the government,  having a  second mover advantage,  sets 
a  high  enough tariff so  as  to expropriate the gross  profits of the foreign  firm 
11 Domestic welfare is defined as the (unweighted) sum of domestic firm's profits and consumer 
surplus.  The latter consists of the net surplus of consumers purchasing the high, and the low, 
quality good and is given by, CS =  SI [e2  - (e-xi)2]_pixi +S2[(e-xi)2 - (B-xi -x2)2]-P2X2' 
12There is  also  a  symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies where each firm  chooses with 
some positive probability the higher quality good and otherwise chooses the lower quality good. 
In line with all the existing literature on vertical product differentiation, we abstain from the 
analysis of mixed strategy equilibria (see e.g Tirole (1989), Motta (1993),  Shaked and Sutton 
(1982,1983, 1984), Sutton (1992)). 
8 resulting in negative profits.  Given this, the foreign firm always produces the low 
quality good.  Below we  examine the two cases.  In  the rest of the paper we use 
the follmving  notation;  UFT-HighjLow Quality refers  to the equilibrium in the 
benchmark case (u)nder (f)ree (t)rade (UFT) always. 
(i)  UFT-High Quality Foreign Firm 
Let [ be the per-unit output t.ariff imposed on t.he  high qualit.y foreign firm. 
For analytical convenience, define t =  ~.  Then t.he  profit.s of t.he foreign and t.he 
.  - 82  s2 
domestIc firm  are,  7f1  =  Pl (Xl) X2) Xl  - teXl  - T and  7f2  =  P2 (Xl, X2) X2  - T, 
respectively.  In the last stage, each firm  chooses its output to maximize profits 
taking t.he output of its rival as given,  From the first order condit.ions we obtain 
the best response functioIls, 
US l  -- S:2X2  - Ot  e  - Xl 
Xl =  X2 =  (3.1) 
251  2 
The tariff effectin~ly increases the marginal cost of the foreign firm.  Thus, due to 
the downward shift of the reaction function, the market share of the foreign firm 
decreases and that of the domestic firm  increases  13.  From (3.1)  the equilibrium 
outputs are, 
2 
and the equilibrium profits, 7f;(t, 51, 52)  =  SiX:
2 -1-, i  =  1,2. 
In the second stage, the government selects the optimal tariff that maximizes 
total domestic welfare taking as gincn the quality choices of the foreign and the 
domestic firm.  Total domestic welfare is  the sum of consumer surplus,14 domestic 
firm's  profits  and tariff reven11es  (tOxi).  From  (3.2)  and  (2.3),  and after some 
manipulations, we  get: 
T1V(t, 51, 52)  =  -
SI + 5152 + 2s1t - 3t  -e2  _  52 
[ 
2  2]  2 
2(451-52)  2 
From  the first  order condition we  obtain the optimal tariff,  [*  Te.  The 
optimal time consistent import tariff is  proportional to the foreign firm's quality 
and increases with the size of the market, e.  The higher is the quality the foreign 
13This is the market share effect in Brander and Spencer. 
14see  footnote L 
9 firm chooses in the first stage, the higher is the import tariff it faces.  This results 
in lower market share and profits for  the foreign firm.  In fact, provided that the 
domestic firm is  the low quality producer, the profits of the foreign firm always 
turn out to be negative independent of the quality level selected by the domestic 
firm in the first stage.  The foreign firm thus has no incentive to produce the high 
quality good. 
To see this, let the domestic and the foreign firm thus select their qualities in 
the first stage anticipating that the government's optimal tariff will be t*  =  1"-0. 
Then from (3.2) we obtain the firms' outputs as functions of their qualities, 
(3.4) 
2 
and the profits are,  7r;(81' 82) =  8iX;2 - T' i  =  1,2.  Given the quality of its rival 
each firm chooses its quality level to maximize profits.  The first order conditions 
can be then written as (A  =  ~), 
8  (A)  =  [16(4+A)]02 
2  9(4-A)3 
(3.5) 
To show that the foreign firm never produces the high quality good, it is suf-
ficient  to show that its profits,  7rl (81,82), are always negative.  First, it can be 
checked  that the domestic  firm  never  chooses  a  quality level  82  <  0.1110
2
,  In 
fact,  from  the first  order condition of the domestic firm  (3.5)  we  observe that 
the optimal qllali ty for  the domestic firm is always larger than 0.1110
2 
(the min-
imum attained at A =  0,  i.e.  81  =  +(0),  Moreover, it can be checked that max 
Sl 
-2 
7rl(81,82)  < 0 for  all  82  > 0.05681498  .  Therefore, the foreign firm's profits are 
always negative whenever the (lower quality) domestic firm sets its quality level 
optimally.  Thus the foreign firm never chooses to be the higher quality producer 
under time consistent import tariffs,  These results are summarized in the follow-
ing proposition. 
Proposition 3.1.  An  UFT-high  quality foreign  firm,  anticipating the ex-post 
optimal tarifft* =  1"-0, never produces the high quality good under time consistent 
import tariffs. 
As is shown below, the only possible configuration of qualities in equilibrium is 
with the domestic firm producing the high-, and the foreign firm the low-, quality 
10 good"  The inability  of the domestic  government  to commit  to  a  tariff affects 
the market structure.  This results in a  reversal  in the quality ladder with the 
UFT-foreign firm switching qualities and producing the low quality good instead" 
(ii)  UFT-Iow quality foreign firm 
The analysis is similar to when the foreign firm is of high quality.  The domestic 
52 
and the foreign firm's profits are, 'ifl  = PI (Xl, X2) Xl - ~  and 'if2  = P2 (Xl, X2) X2-
-,  52 
t8X2 - ~, respectively  In the last stage firms simultancously choose their outputs" 
From the foes  we obtain the best response functions, 
eSl  - X2 S2 
Xl = ----;  2s l  . 
Then the eqnilibrium outputs are, 
2 
and the equilibrium profits are, 'if;(t, SI, S2) = s;x:2 - ~. 
(3,6) 
The Gm'ernment. selects a tariff in the second stage to maximize total domestic 
\\'elfare,  which from  (3.6)  and (2.3)  can be -written as, 
TH T =  S1 52  - SlS2 + -SlS2t - Sit _  e2 _  SI  [3  2  2  '),  3'  2],  2 
2S:2(4S1 -. S2)  2 
(3.7) 
From the first order concli tion \Ye derive the optimal tariff for  the government, 
I* =  ( l'  )  e.  Note, as before the optimal tariff is proportional to the foreign firm's 
quality and the size of the market.  The optimal time consistent tariff creates a 
dis-incenti\'c for  the foreign firm  to invest in quality in the first  stage and thus, 
as is shown below, its quality level will  be lower than under free trade. 
In the first  stage,  the firms  simultaneously select qualities anticipating that 
the government will choose an import tariff I* = 1'e.  From (3.6)  we  get, 
(3.8) 
d  ()  2  8
2  b  aniTt S11 S2  =  SiX;  - 2"  Then the first  order conditions can  e  written as 
('where A = £2.) 
Sl  ' 
11 8  (A)  =  (4 + A)  7i 
2  9(4-A)3  (3.9) 
Dividing 82(A)  with 81(A)  and solving for  A we obtain A*  =  0.02858415.  Then 
from (3.9),  (3.8)  and (3.7)  we obtain the equilibrium qualities, quantities, profits 
as  well  as  the optimal tariff and total domestic welfare  under time consistent 
import tariffs: 
8i  = 0.2500H?  8; = 0.00715(?  s* = 0.215[/ 
xi = .49888  x; = .083938  t*  =  0.002380~ 
ITi  = 0.030950






Proposition 3.2.  Under  time consistent import tariffs,  there is  a  unique sub-
game perfect equilibrium where the foreign  firm  is always the lower quality pro-
ducer.  If the government cannot precommit to a policy, the optimal tariff induces 
a reversal in the quality ladder whenever the foreign  firm is of  high quality under 
free  trade.  The qualities offered  by the firms  under time consistent tariffs are 
lower than the equilibrium qualities under free  trade.  However,  average quality 
and domestic welfare are always higher under time consistent tariffs than under 
free  trade. 
Note that, while the foreign firm's  profits are positive when it produces the 
low  quality good,  they are always negative if it produces the high quality good. 
Hence, an UFT-high quality foreign firm,  anticipating the ex-post optimal tariff 
I* =  (¥-) 0 (where 8 f  is its own quality) will switch qualities and instead produce 
the low  quality good.  On the other hand, an UFT-Iow quality foreign firm still 
produces the low  quality good after the imposition of the tariff.  This is  due to 
the fact  that the government chooses  a  tariff so  as to expropriate a  great part 
of the foreign firm's  gross  profits as the foreign firm's quality costs are already 
sunk when the government decides its policy.  Since gross profits are higher when 
the foreign firm  produces the high quality good, the government can raise more 
revenues by imposing a higher tariff on the high quality foreign firm. 
15This is the unique real root of the equation that is smaller than one. 
12 Due to the imposition of the tariff firms  offer  lower qualities than under free 
trade.  The foreign firm, faced with the import tariff, offers a lower quality (rela,tive 
to a UFT-low quality producer) in order to save on costs of quality and thus obtain 
positive profits.  As product differentiation increases, the domestic firm also saves 
on  quality costs  by offering  a  lower  quality  (relative  to the UFT-high quality 
producer).  Note,  average quality increases  as  the tariff shifts the market share 
from the Im\'  quality foreign firm to the high quality domestic firm.  Further, the 
reduction in total output due to the imposition of the tariff outweighs the positive 
effect of the increase in average quality and results in lower consumer surplus than 
under free trade. 
Finally, domestic welfare is  higher under time consistent tariffs independently 
of whether the foreign finn is  of high-,  or low-,  quality under free  trade16 .  The 
import  tariff increases  domestic  welfare  by  shifting rents to the domestic firm 
and tariff revenues to the domestic government.  Note that, since the tariff also 
affects  the market structure  (by  inducing a  quality reversal),  the rent shifting 
effect  is  much stronger when the foreign firm  is  of high quality under free  trade 
and domestic welfare  increases  rrmch  more relative to \vhen the foreign  firm  is 
of low  quality  (under free  trade).  Our finding  is  in line with the Grossman 
(1988)  critique that the long nm \'iew  of the rent  shifting  effect  may be very 
different than the short nm view  gh'en in Brander and Spencer (1985).  In fact 
in our long nm scenario where finns first choose quality and then compete in the 
market, the rent shifting effect is  reinforced due to the reversal in the equilibrium 
quality  configuration  induced  by  the time consistent  tariff.  The import  tariff 
transforms the UFT-low quality domestic firm into a high quality producer, thus 
transferring rents to the domestic firm of a much higher magnitude than in the 
classical Brander and Spencer rent shifting effect. 
4. Optilnal Tariffs under Government Precommitlnent 
\Ve  now  assume that the government can precommit to a  specific  tariff before 
the firms select their qualities and quantities.  Given the import tariff set by the 
government, the firms  (simultaneously) select their qualities in the second stage, 
and finally choose their outputs (simultaneously).  The main question we address 
in this section is  whether a gm'ernment's ability to precommit to an import tariff 
160.'ote,  and as is  seen below,  under Bertrand competition total welfare only increases if the 
foreign firm is  high quality ex-ante. 
13 leads to higher domestic welfare compared to when the government cannot credi-
bly commit to a policy. If  precommitment increases welfare, then the government 
would have an incentive to build (if possible) some mechanism through which it 
can precommit to a policy; otherwise, the government will follow a time consistent 
policy by setting the ex-post optimal level of tariff.  Interestingly, and contrary 
to what has been observed with subsidies17,  government precommitment to an 
import tariff always leads to lower  domestic welfare than under time consistent 
tariffs..  The reason is simple.  A non-committal government, by setting its tariff 
after the firms have incurred the sunk costs of quality, can expropriate the gross 
profits of the foreign firm.  On the other hand, a government who precommits to 
an import tariff can only shift part of the foreign firm's  net profits to the home 
government's treasury and to the domestic firm.  When the government moves 
second, the pie on which it has claims increases and, as a result, domestic welfare 
increases. 
As in the previous section, we consider both the cases where the foreign firm 
is  of high-,  and of low-,  quality under free  trade.  The last stage of the game 
is  as above and the equilibrium outputs are given by (3.2),  and (3.6), when the 
foreign firm is  t.he high, and low, qualit.y producer under free t.rade, respectively. 
Contrary to t.he  case of t.ime  consist.ent.  t.ariffs,  t.he  imposit.ion of a  t.ariff from a 
government.  who  possesses  a  precommit.ment.  mechanism has no impact.  on t.he 
market st.ruct.ure.  The domestic and t.he  foreign firm do not swit.ch posit.ions in 
the qualit.y ladder, even though t.hey  adjust. t.heir qualit.y level in t.he  presence of 
the import. tariff. 
(i)  UFT-high quality foreign firm 
In t.he second st.age t.he domest.ic and the foreign firm choose qualities simul-
2 
taneously t.o  maximize profits, 7ri(t,Sl,S2) = SiX;2 -1-,i = 1,2.  Defining>. =  ~ 
and /1  =  J....,  from (3.2)  the first order conditions can be expressed as: 
51 
s  (>.  ) =  [(2 - >.  - 2/1) (8 - 2>' + >.2 + 8/1 + 2>'/1)]71  (4.1) 
1  , /1  (4 _  >.)3 
s  (>.  ) =  [(4 + >.)  (1 + /1)2] 02  (4.2) 
2  ,/1  (4_>.)3 
First.,  we det.ermine the interval of tariffs for  which the foreign firm stays in 
the domestic market.  Define tm  as the maximum permissible tariff, i.e.  the tariff 
17See, for example, Leahy and Neary (1995, 1996,1997), Goldberg (1995). 
14 for  which the foreign firm's profits are zero.  Using (4.1), (4.2), and the zero profit 
condition for the foreign firm,  and solving for (t, 51, 52), we obtain tm  =  0.02765e
2 
and the associated quality ratio is,  Am  = 0.57538.  This is  the tariff that leaves 
the foreign firm indifferent between staying in, or exiting, the market.  Hence, the 
relevant interval for  import tariffs is  t  E  [0, 0.02765e
2
].  Further, as p  =  t  =  0 
corresponds to free trade, the associated interval of quality ratios is A E  [0.35811, 
0.57538]. 
By dividing expressions (4.1) and (4,2), and simplifying we obtain an equation 
involving only A and p18  Solving this equation for  IL  and choosing the positive 
root19  we  get p(A).  Plotting p(A)  in the relevant  interval of quality ratios it is 
easily  seen  that dp/clA  >  O.  Further,  substituting  p(A)  in  (4.1)  and  (4.2)  we 
obtain 51(A)  and 52(A).20  By plotting these expressions,  it is  seen that 52(A)  is 
increasing and 51 (A)  is decreasing with A,  0.35811  ~ A ~  0.57538. Moreover, since 
t(A)  =  51 (A) ./1(A) ,by  plotting we  see that dA/ dt  >  0 for  A in the relevant range. 
Therefore,  as the tariff on the imports increases,  the foreign firm  decreases and 
the domestic firm increases its quality (see figure-I). 
< figure-1  here > 
l\Ioreover,  nsing (3,2)  and plotting we  see that m'erage quality increases with 
the tariff (figure-1).  This is due to the fact.  that both the market share and quality 
of the domestic firm  increase.  This more than compensates for  the decrease in 
quality and output of the foreign firm. 
Further, substituting 5, (A),  i = 1,2 and t(A)  in (3.2), we obtain firms'  profits, 
consumer surplus and domestic welfare as functions of A.  By plotting these func-
tions for  A,  0.35811  ~ A ~ 0.57538,  and taking into account.  that dA/ dt  >  0 in 
this range, we  derive the following results (see figure 2). 
< figure-2 here> 
As  expected,  the profits  of  the high-quality foreign  firm,  *1,  are maximum 
under free trade and decrease with the level of the tariff.  As the tariff transfers 
18This is  an equation which  is  quadratic in  JL,  i,e  (4 + 17'\ + 4,\2)p2 + (8 + 2,\ + 4,\3)f.L  = 
15,\- 12 .  .\2  +4,\3 - X~ - 4 
19Since 81,82 and t are positive,  f.L  and ,\ arc also positive, and the relevant root is the positive 
root of the equation. 
20The  analytical expressions  of f.L(,\) , 8,('\), t('\)  etc.  are  available  from  the  authors  upon 
request. 
15 rents to the domestic producer, the domestic firm's profits, 7[2,  increase with the 
tariff and reach their maximum at the maximum tariff,  t m .  Consumer surplus 
decreases initially as total output decreases with the tariff, then increases due to 
the average quality upgrading effect.  Consumer surplus is maximum under free 
trade.  However, domestic welfare increases with the tariff and is  thus maximized 
at the maximum tariff tmo 
Therefore, as the government sets the import tariff in the first stage to max-
imize domestic welfare, the optimal precommitment tariff is t = tm = O.02765e
2
• 
The foreign firm,  faced with the optimal tariff, stays in the market making zero 
(net) profits.  The equilibrium outcome and welfare under government precom-
mitment when the foreign firm is of high quality is, 
81 = O.24517(l  82 = O.14107e:l  s = O.19506(l 
Xl  = O.35013e  X2  = O.32494e  t = O.02765e:l 
7[1  = 0  7[2  = O.OO494(t  CS = O.03852e'l 
TW =  O.05315t 
Interestingly, domestic welfare under the optimal precommitment import tar-
iff,  TW, is  lower  than when the government is  unable to credibly commit to a 
tariff (T1V*  =  O.062576t). 
(ii)  UFT-Iow quality foreign firm 
U  sing similar arguments as in the previous case, we can determine the foreign 
and domestic firms'  choice  of qualities in the second stage as  functions  of the 
level of tariff imposed on the low  quality foreign firm.  Defining X  = ±  =  ~  and 
j1  = t =  :2  and using  (3.6), the first  order conditions for  the domestic and the 
foreign firm can be written as: 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
The above equations together with the zero profit condition for the foreign firm 
determine the maximum permissible tariff,  t~ =  O.01064e
2  and the associated 
16 ratio of qualities, 
[ 
-21  t  E  0,0.01064e j 
Am  =  3.513.  Hence,  the relevant  range of import tariffs  is, 
and the associated interval  of qnality ratios is,  ~ E  [2.79243, 
3.513]. 
< figure-3 here > 
In figure-3 the domestic and the foreign firm's qualities are drawn as functions 
of the import tariff in the relevant range.21  As  the tariff becomes increasingly 
protective both firms lower their qualities.  Interestingly, due to a substantial shift 
in market shares towards the high qnality domestic firm,  average qnality in the 
market increases with the tariff. 
Further, the effects  of  Cl  tariff  011  firms'  profits,  conS11mer  surplus and total 
domestic welfare  are analyzed.  As  in  the pre\-ious  case,  the profits of the low-
quality foreign firm  are maximum llnder free  trade and decrease with the tariff 
(becoming zero at the maximum tariff t~,J.  \\1hile the profits of the domestic firm 
increase with the tariff and reach their maximum at t~"  i.e.  'when the foreign firm 
is  indifferent between staying in, or exiting, the market (figure-4).  Consumer sur-
plus, however, decreases with the tariff due to both, the downgrading of qualities 
and the restriction of total output..  Once more,  domestic \velfare increases with 
the import tariff and reaches its maximum at  t~L  (figure-4).  This is explained by 
the fact  that profits of the domestic firm  increa..c;e  by an amount larger than the 
decrease in dornestjc consnmer surplus. 
< figme-4 here> 
In the first  stage,  the government will  set a  tariff of t =  t~ =  0.010648
2 
to 
maximize domestic welfare.  As  in the previous case,  the foreign firm will stay in 
the market making howe\'er  net profits equal to zero.  The equilibrium outcome 
under the optimal precommitment tariff when the foreign firm is low quality is, 
51  = 0.25123tf  52 = 0.07151e~  5 = 0.19991e~ 
Xl  = 0.47318  X2  = 0.189068  t = 0.01064e~ 
*1 = 0.02467e
4 
*2 = 0  CS = 0.0357ge
4 
T1V = 0.06247t 
-'  .. 
Note that, also in this case domestic welfare under government precommitment 
21 The expressions for  Il().,),  Si ().,)  and t().,)  etc.  are available from the authors upon request. 
t\ote that d)..jdt > 0 for  )..  in  the rallge [2.79243,  3.513]. 
17 is lower than under time consistent import tariffs (TW* =  0.062576(
4
). The above 
results are summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 4.1.  When the government precommits to a tariff, the market struc-
ture is unaffected in the sense that a UFT-high (-low) quality foreign Brm remains 
the high  (low)  quality producer under optimal tariffs.  Optimal precommitment 
tariffs are always higher than the optimal time consistent tariffs.  A verage quality 
is higher,  but total output is lower,  when  the government cannot credibly com-
mit to a  tariff.  Even  though  consumer surplus is higher when  the government 
precommits to a  tariff,  domestic welfare is  always higher under time consistent 
tariffs. 
We  have seen  that, independently of whether the foreign  firm  is  the high-, 
or low-,  quality producer under free  trade, the optimal precommitment tariff is 
the maximum (restrictive)  tariff for  which the foreign firm stays in the market. 
The profits of the foreign firm are zero under government precommitment, while 
they are positive under time consistent tariffs.  In the latter case, the foreign firm, 
acting as a Stackelberg leader, strategically chooses a lower quality to induce a low 
tariff on its imports from the government  (see Proposition 1),  and thus attains 
positive  profits.  As  a  consequence,  optimal time consistent  tariffs  are always 
lower  than optimal precommitment tariffs.  Moreover,  the low  quality good is 
of a much lower quality under time consistent tariffs and, in addition, a smaller 
quantity of it is  imported.  This,  in turn,  leads  to a  lower  total output and a 
smaller amount of tariffs collected under non-credible policies.  However,  due to 
a substantial switch of market share towards the domestic firm,  which is  always 
the high quality producer under time consistent  tariffs,  average quality in the 
market increases.  This increase in average quality, however, is not strong enough 
to compensate for  the reduction of total output, and thus consumer surplus is 
lower when the government cannot precommit to a tariff. 
Interestingly, the government can improve domestic welfare by not committing 
to a specific tariff.  Therefore, whenever the trade policy tool is an import tariff, 
the government has no incentive to build a precommitment mechanism; it would 
rather set the ex-post optimal tariff after the domestic and the foreign firm have 
selected their qualities.  Since both consumer surplus and tariff revenues are lower 
under time consistent policies, the improvement in welfare stems exclusively from 
the rent shifting effect.  If  the foreign firm is the high quality producer under free 
trade, the optimal time consistent tariff induces a reversal in the quality ladder 
18 with the domestic firm  thus becoming the high  quality producer.  As  the high 
quality firm has a larger share of the market relative to the low quality firm,  l'md 
charges a  higher price, the net revenues accruing to the domestic firm from the 
imposition of the time consistent tariff increase substantially. On the other hand, 
the imposition of an optimal precommitment  tariff does  not  affect  the market 
structure.  Thus, although it increases  the (low  quality)  domestic firm's profits, 
this increase is  of a lower order of magnitude and hence the rent shifting effect is 
much stronger under time consistent policies.  As  a result, in this case domestic 
welfare is substantially higher when the government cannot precommit to a tariff, 
On the other hand,  a  UFT-low quality foreign  firm  remains the low quality 
producer under both types of policies.  Under time consistent tariffs,  the foreign 
firm selects a  (much) lower quality as it anticipates a tariff that will expropriate 
its gross profits.  As  competition is  relaxed through product differentiation, the 
domestic firm  also lowers  its quality to save on costs of quality.  Domestic firm 
sales are also higher under time consistent tariffs.  Hence the rent shifting effect is 
stronger than when the gm'ernment precommits to a policy,  and it compensates 
for  the two  negative  (consumer surplus and tariff revenues)  effects,  resulting in 
higher domestic \\'elfarc under time consistent tariffs. 
5.  Optimal Tilne Consistent Subsidies and Exit 
Consider now that the government's policy instrument. is  a subsidy on domestic 
olltpuL  As the literature has recognized, the strategic role of subsidies differs from 
that of tariffs.  Subsidies sen'e mainly to correct for market power in the domestic 
market, and tariffs to shift rents to the domestic firm (sce e.g.  Dixit (1988), Collie 
(1991)).  In fact, as is shown below, a non-committal government can fully correct 
for the domestic market imperfection, as the optimal time consistent subsidy leads 
to marginal cost pricing. 
As in section 3,  we assume that the firms make their quality choice anticipating 
that the government will  set the ex·-post.  optimal subsidy for  the domestic firm 
given firm qualities.  Contrary to the case of tariffs, if the policy instrument is  a 
per-unit output subsidy the government has a second mover disadvantage.  The 
domestic firm, by strategically overinvesting in quality in the first stage, can induce 
a high subsidy on its output.  The foreign firm, anticipating that its domestic rival 
will receive a  high subsidy ex-post, prefers to stay out of t.he  market because it 
expects gross profits that are not enough to cover its sunk costs of quality.  Both 
19 the case where the foreign  firm  is  the high,  or the low,  quality producer under 
free trade are subsequently analyzed. 
(i)  UFT-high quality foreign firm 
Let the per-unit output subsidy be k.  Define  k  =  ~. In the last stage the 
foreign and the domestic firm choose outputs to maximize their profits, which are 
82  - 82  • 
1fl =  PI (Xl, X2)Xl  - ~  and 1f2  =  P2(Xl, X2)X2 + k()X2 - ~, respectIvely.  From the 
first order conditions we  get the equilibrium outputs, 
(5.1) 
2 
and the equilibrium profits are, 1f;(Sl' S2, k)  = sixi2 -1-, i  = 1,2. In the second 
stage,  the government decides on the subsidy that maximizes domestic welfare 
given the qualities chosen by the foreign and the domestic firm.  Domestic welfare 
equals consumer surplus plus domestic firm's profits, less expenditures on subsidies 
(k8x2).  Using (2.3)  and (5.1), it can be checked that, 
(5.2) 
Maximizing TW with respect  to k,  we  obtain the optimal time consistent 
subsidy, k*  =  S28;  'k*is  proportional to the quality of the domestic firm and the 
market  size.  The domestic  firm  can thus  strategically select  a  higher level  of 
quality in order to obtain a higher output subsidy from its government.  In fact, 
the domestic firm,  who has the first mover advantage, will choose a high enough 
quality level (thus obtaining a high output subsidy) such that the foreign firm can 
never make positive profits by  producing the higher quality good.  Anticipating 
that its rival will receive a high subsidy ex-post the foreign firm stays out of the 
market to avoid the sunk costs of quality. 
To  see  this,  let  the foreign  and the domestic  firm  select  their  qualities in 
the first stage anticipating the government's (ex-post) optimal subsidy, k*  =  S2. 
Substituting k*  into (5.1) we obtain: 
(5.3) 
20 2 
and the profits are, 7r; (51) 52)  = 5iX;2 - t,  i = 1,2. From the first order condition 
of the domestic firm we have (A =  ~), 
s] 
(A)  = [9(4 + A)]7i 
52  (4-A)3' 
Since 52(A)  is increasing in A,  the quality of the domestic firm will be larger than 
52(0)  =  Ch) 7l.  Further, from (5.3), xi decreases with 52- Hence the foreign firm's 
profits decrease with 52. That is,  7r~(51' 52)  :5  7r~(51' 52(0))  :5  maxS1  7r~(51' 52(0))  = 
- (58 1 1 2) t. Thus, the (under free trade) high quality foreign firm, anticipating that 
the domestic firm receives a high subsidy ex-post, never produces the high quality 
good under time consistent.  subsidies.  As  is  shown below,  the foreign  firm  has 
no incentive to become the lower quality producer either.  Therefore, under time 
consistent subsidies. the domestic firm becomes a monopolist in the home market. 
(ii)  UFT-Iow quality firm 
In the last stage, the domestic and the foreign firm choose output to maximize 
•.  - s2  s2 
the1r profits, ,\"lllch  are 711  = P1 (Xl, X2)X1  + kOX1  - 1- and 712  = P2(X1, X2)X2  - T, 
respecti,·cly.  From the first  order conditions we obtain the equilibrium outputs, 
(5.4) 
and the equilibrillm profits are,  7r;*(51 , 52, k)  =  5;x;2  -.  ~,i =  1,2. In the second 
stage, the Government selects a subsidy that maximizes domestic welfare.  From 
(5.4)  and (2.3),  we  hcwe 
(5.5) 
From the first order condition the time consistent subsidy, k*  = Sle,  is  obtained, 
which  is  again proportional to  the domestic firm's  quality  and the size of the 
market.  As  in the previous case, by selecting a higher quality the domestic firm 
can obtain a high enough subsidy from the government, and thus make low quality 
imports non-profitable.  The foreign  firm  thus  has  no incentive to produce the 
lower quality good and stays out of the home market. 
To see this, note that under the optimal time consistent subsidy (k*  =  SI)  the 
foreign firm's equilibrium output equals zero (from (5.4)).  Thus, in the first stage 
21 the foreign  firm's  profits are always  negative for  any  S2  >  O.  Therefore,  under 
time consistent subsidies, the domestic firm becomes a domestic monopolist, in-
dependently of whether the foreign firm is the high-, or the low-, quality producer 
under free trade. 
Proposition 5.1.  The government's inability to commit to a subsidy has a sig-
nificant impact on market structure.  Anticipating the optimal time consistent 
subsidy,  k*  =  Sd,  where  Sd  is the domestic firm's  quality,  the foreign  firm  stays 
out of the home market and the domestic firm  becomes a monopolist. 
Vie  finally  analyze the equilibrium outcome under a  domestic monopoly.  In 
the last stage, the monopolist chooses its output to maximize profits,  7r  =  Co -
x )sx + kOx - s; ,  and hence its optimal output is: 
[
s + k]- xrn(s,k) =  ~  e  (5.6) 
and its profits  are,  7rrn(s, k)  =  sx~ - s;.  In  the second stage,  the government 
chooses the subsidy to maximize the domestic welfare, 
TW=  e -- [
(2kS - k2 + 3s2) ]-2  S2 
8s  2 
Once more, k*  =  sO,  i.e.  the optimal subsidy is  proportional to the quality of 
the domestic monopolist.  Then its profits are, 7rrn(s)  =  S02 - s;.  In the first stage, 
the domestic firm selects its quality to maximize profits.  Therefore,  Srn  =  0
2
,and 
as result,  Xrn  =  0 i.e.  the monopolist sells  to the entire home market at a  zero 
price.  Finally, as k*  =  Srn  =  02, it can be checked that domestic welfare equals 
zero. 
Proposition 5.2.  Under time consistent subsidies,  the (resulting) domestic mo-
nopolist covers the entire market, at a price equal to marginal cost, offering a high 
quality good in order to obtain a high subsidy from its government.  Optimal time 
consistent subsidies are higher than optimal precommitment subsidies.22  Domestic 
22This  can be seen  by  numerically  evaluating domestic welfare  under  precommitment for 
various subsidy levels.  The optimal precommitment subsidy is  always lower than the optimal 
time consistent subsidy, El  Note that this is  in contrast to Goldberg (1995)  and Leahy and 
Neary (1994,  1996, 1999) where time consistent subsidies are unambiguously lower. 
22 welfare  under the optimal time consistent subsidy equals zero.  Hence,  contrary 
to  the  case of tariffs,  the government's  precommitment  to  a  subsidy improves 
domestic welfare. 
The intuition  is  as  follows.  Given  that,  the subsidy  depends  on domestic 
quality and that the government  is  unable to  precommit to a  specific  subsidy 
level,  the (resulting)  domestic firm,  anticipating that it will be a  monopolist in 
the domestic market, will strategically offer a high quality good in order to obtain 
a  high subsidy.  As  the subsidy it receives is  quite high,  the monopolist sells to 
the entire market at a  zero  price.  In addition,  total expendit.ures on subsidies 
are as high as the sum of prod1lcer and consumer surplus, thus resulting in zero 
domest.ic welfare. 
Now,  it is  easy to show that any small subsidy under precommitment results 
in  positive  domestic  welfare.  Given  that under free  trade domestic  welfare  is 
O.04291t and O.05964t,when the foreign firm is  of low and high quality, respec-
tively.  Any  arbitrarily small subsidy would also  give  positive domestic welfare. 
Thus, the goyernmcnt prefers to precommit if it chooses to subsidize the domestic 
firm. 
6. Bertrand COlnpetition 
Om qualitatiye results do not change under price competition.  Time-consistent 
subsidies induce exit of the foreign firm and tariffs always ensure that t.he domes-
tic firm  produces the high-quality good.  Domestic \yelfare is  higher under time 
consistent  tariffs  than  llnder  precommitment.  only  if  the foreign  firm  produces 
the high qllality  good under  free  trade.  This is  due to the fact that the qual-
ity s"witching  induced by  the tariff giyes  the domestic firm  substantially higher 
profits than if it \yere  the low  quality firm.  However,  if the domestic firm  pro-
duces the high quality good under free  trade then the rent shifting effect  is  not 
big enough and the reduction in consumer surplus results in decrease in domestic 
welfare.  In the case of time consistent subsidies,  as is  under Cournot competi-
tion, the foreign firm exits the market and domestic welfare is always lower than 
under precommitment subsidies.  Contrary to the Eaton and Grossman  (1986) 
result,  the qualitative results and the optimal trade policy instruments are not 
re\'ersed under price competition in our model.  \Ve  summarize and discuss our 
main findings  for  the price competition case and compare them with our results 
23 under Cournot competition23.  We first present the results for the tariff case and 
then for  subsidies. 
6.1. Tariffs 
Suppose that the government's policy tool is  a tariff on imports.  As in quantity 
competition, the inability of the government to commit to a tariff has an important 
impact on the market structure.  Once more, there is  a unique equilibrium under 
time  consistent  tariffs,  in which  the domestic  firm  is  always  the high  quality 
producer, independently of whether it is  the high-,  or low-,  quality firm  under 
free trade.24  The reason for  the quality reversal when the foreign firm produces 
the high quality good under free trade is somewhat different than in the Cournot 
case.  A high quality foreign  firm,  anticipating expropriation of its gross profits 
due to a high (ex-post) optimal tariff, lowers its quality substantially to save on 
sunk costs of quality.  However,  as the foreign firm's quality is not too high, the 
(low  quality)  domestic firm  can increase its profits by producing a  higher level 
of quality than its rival and thus becoming the higher quality producer.  Thus, 
when the government is  unable to commit to a tariff, a market structure with a 
high quality foreign firm and a low quality domestic firm cannot be sustained in 
equilibrium. 
As in the Cournot case, the equilibrium qualities under time consistent tariffs 
are lower than under free trade.  Domestic welfare is higher under time consistent 
tariffs than under both free  trade and precommitment tariffs only if the foreign 
firm is  of high quality under free trade.  Evidently, due to the quality reversal in 
this case, domestic firm's profits increase substantially.  This strong rent shifting 
effect dominates the two negative effects  (consumer surplus and tariff revenues) 
and leads to a higher level of welfare when the government cannot credibly commit 
to a tariff.  However, contrary to the Cournot case, if the domestic firm produces 
the high quality good under free trade, government precommitment to a tariff has 
a  positive value and it leads to higher domestic welfare.  The above results are 
summarized in the following proposition. 
23 All results are presented in the appendix. 
24For  similar reasons as  in quantity competition,  there are two  asymmetric pure strategy 
equilibria under free trade:  (i)  foreign firm of high quality and domestic firm of low quality and 
(ii) vice versa.  Again, the high quality firm obtains higher profits in equilibrium (see Appendix 
for details). 
24 Proposition 6,1.  Under  time consistent import  tariffs and price competition, 
there is  a  unique  equilibrium  where  the  foreign  firm  is  always  the low quaJity 
producer.  If the government cannot precommit to a policy and the foreign  firm 
produces the high quality good under free  trade then the optimal tariff induces a 
reversal in the quality ladder.  The quality offered by both the firms  under time 
consistent  tariffs is  lower  than  under free  trade.  Under  time consistent tariffs, 
domestic welfare is higher (lower) than under both optimal precommitment tariffs 
and free  trade,  whenever the  foreign  firm  produces the high  (low)  quality good 
under free  trade. 
6.2. Subsidies 
Suppose next that the gm'ernment's policy tool is  a subsidy on the domestic fir-
m's output..  In this case, int.erestingly,  the results are independent of the type of 
competition in the product market. If the gm'ernment is unable to precommit to 
a subsidy, the foreign firm al-ways stays out of the market, independently whether 
it is  of high-,  or low-,  quality firm  under free  trade.  Thus, the market structure 
is  again influenced by the trade policy.  That is,  in the unique equilibrium, the 
domestic firm becomes a heavily subsidized monopolist which offers the high qual-
ity good to the entire domestic:  market at a  zero price.  Once more,  and for  the 
same reasons as ill the case of quantity competition, with this high subsidy (that 
exactly equals quality) total domestic welfare is zero.  The results are summarized 
in the following proposition. 
Proposition 6.2.  Ullder  time cOllsistent  subsidies price and quantity competi-
tion lead to the same equilibrium outcomes  ..  The foreign  firm always stays out of 
the market.  In  order to obtain a high subsidy from the government the (resulting) 
domestic monopolist covers  the entire market offering a  high quality good.  Do-
mestic welfare under the optimal time consistent subsidy equals zero.  Hence,  and 
contrary to the case of tariffs, government precommitment to a subsidy improves 
domestic 1velfare. 
7.  Conclusion 
\Ve show that in a vertically difIerentiated industry the impact of trade policies, 
such as  import  tariffs  and domestic output subsidies,  on equilibrium outcomes 
25 and domestic welfare is  qualitatively the same.  Our result holds  regardless of 
whether the firms compete in prices or quantities in the domestic market.  This is 
in contrast to Eaton and Grossman's finding that the optimal policy is reversed 
when the market competition changes from quantity to price competition (1986). 
We instead show that, if the government is  unable to commit to a policy, it will 
set a  positive level  of tariff,  or subsidy,  independently of the mode of market 
competition. 
Contrary to homogenous or horizontally differentiated industries, in vertically 
differentiated industries trade policies  may have a  dramatic impact on market 
structure whenever the government cannot commit to a policy.  Under time con-
sistent tariffs the domestic firm  always produces the high-,  and the foreign firm 
the low-,  quality good.  Thus,  if the foreign  firm  is  of high-,  and the domestic 
firm of low-,  quality under free trade, the tariff induces a reversal in the quality 
ladder.  Under time consistent subsidies an (UFT) high-, or low-,  quality foreign 
firm decides not to enter the domestic market knowing that the domestic firm can 
strategically induce a high subsidy from its government ex-post.  The resulting 
market structure is a domestic monopolist with domestic welfare of zero.  Despite 
the fact that the monopolist prices at marginal cost and that the entire domestic 
market is  covered,  domestic governments' expenditures on subsidies are so high 
that they offset  the positive effect  on consumer surplus.  Since free  trade leads 
to positive domestic welfare,  so  does  the government's commitment to a  small 
subsidy.  Thus, with subsidies precommitment always results in higher domestic 
welfare than non-committal independent of price or quantity competition.  Pre-
commitment, as in Leahy and Neary (1996,  1999), is also the best policy regime 
under subsidies. 
The only possible equilibrium, if the policy tool is a tariff, is where the domestic 
firm always produces the high quality good and the foreign firm the low quality 
good.  This happens as the ex-post optimal tariff is increasing in the foreign firms' 
quality and the foreign  firm  has no incentive to produce the high quality good. 
Domestic welfare is greater than under free trade and under precommitment when 
the government does not commit to a  tariff.  This is  always true, except if the 
firms compete in prices and the domestic firm is of high quality under free trade. 
Therefore, commitment has a positive value (in the sense that it increases domestic 
welfare) but only if the government's policy tool is a subsidy. 
A natural question arises here.  If,  as  in Hwang and Schulman (1993),  the 
government can commit to a policy instrument at the first stage, but not to its 
26 level  (as  is  the case in om paper)  to what instrument will it precommit?  Our 
analysis reveals that a  non-committal government will always impose a  tariff on 
the foreign  firm.  By choosing  tariffs  it can induce the foreign  firm  to switch 
qualities thereby producing the low quality good.  However, if it chooses subsidies 
they can result in a subsidized domestic monopoly.  Our results are important in 
that they highlight that non-committal may in-fact be a welfare improving policy 
in a  vertically differentiated industry under tariffs.  In fact,  non-committal may 
be the best protection argument for  a country.  For example, just the retroactive 
threat of imposing tariffs on  Japan caused it to withdraw the export of its high 
quality cars. 
In line with Grossman  (1988),  we  demonstrate that in our model the long 
term view of the rent shifting effect is,  in fact, very different than the short term 
view  as  given  in  Brander and Spencer  (1985).  The rent  transfer effect  due to 
a  tariff in  our  model  is  often  of  a  higher  order  of magnitude because quality 
configurations may change due to the time consistent tariff.  An ex-post optimal 
tariff effectively transfers revenues from the (under free trade) high-quality foreign 
firm to the (after tariff) high-quality domestic firm.  Since due to non-commitment 
the domestic finn always produces the high quality good and thus earns a much 
higher level of profits, the effect  on domestic welfare is  more dramatic than when 
the government commits to a  policy.  In the latter case,  even though the tariff 
induces firms  to adjust both their long term variables (qualities) and short term 
\'ariables (outputs or prices), the rent shifting effect is smaller because the market 
structure is  unaffected by the precommitment tariff. 
There are a  number of limitations in our analysis.  First, we  do not consider 
that the gm'ernment can use multiple instruments, e.g.  an import tariff together 
with a domestic output subsidy (as ill Dixit (1988)  and Collie (1991)).  \Vhether 
a  government can attain the first  best outcome with the use of multiple policy 
tools  and if so  what set of tools  would be necessary to achieve this target is  a 
question for  further  investigation.  Our analysis leads us  to conjecture that,  if 
the government is  unable to commit, the first  best outcome cannot be attained 
with the combination of import tariffs and output subsidies.  Second, we  do not 
study retaliation  games  between  the foreign  and domestic  governments.  This 
issue would be especially interesting in the case where a non-committal domestic 
government provides subsidies to the domestic firm.  Especially if retaliation by 
the foreign government would alter the foreign firm's decision to stay out of the 
domestic market. 
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October 7,  1999 1.  The Bertrand Competition Case 
Let  us  now  aSSllme  that  the domestic  and the foreign  firm  compete in prices 
in  the home market,  with  all  the other specifications  of  the model  remaining 
the same.  Vve  first  present the equilibrium outcome under free  trade, and then 
analyze the cases where (i)  the government's trade policy is a tariff on the foreign 
firm's imports and (ii)  its policy is  a subsidy on the domestic firm's output.  Both 
the time consistent trade policy scenario and the government's commitment to 
a  policy scenario will  be considered and compared in each case.  Recall that the 
demands for  the high and low quality good are, 
- P1  - P2  '  ,  lh - P2  P2 
X1(P1,P2)=8- ;  X2(Pl,P2)=  -- (1.1) 
SI- 52  51- 5 2 5 2 
Under free  trade,  in the last  stage finn i  chooses its price to maximize its 
2 
profits,  Xi(Pi, Pj jp,  - t, taking as  given  the price of its rival Pj  and the quali-
ties selected ill  the first  stage (for  details,  see  ~Iotta, 1993).  From the reaction 
functions, 
(1.2) 
we  get the equilibrimll prices, 
(  1.3) 
In  the first stage, firm  i  chooses  5i to maximize 71; (51,52) taking as given the 
qnality of its rival sJ',  Defining the ratio of qualities, A =  ~, and dividing the two 
51 
first order conditions, after some manipulations we get the free trade equilibrium 
qualities, prices, profits, consumer surplus and domestic welfare: 
5{t =  .2533171
2  5~t = .0482471
2  V
t  = ~  = 0.19043 
51 
p{t = .1076671




ft  -4  ft  -4  -4 
7'1  = 0.024448  712  = 0,001538  T"Vfh = 0.044758 
1 
-4 
Ti¥f/ = 0.067668 where TWfh (TWft )  is the domestic welfare under free trade when the foreign 
firm produces the high (low)  quality good and the domestic firm the low  (high) 
quality good.  Note that under free trade, there are two asymmetric (pure strategy) 
equilibria where one firm is the high quality producer and the other the low quality 
producer.  Domestic firm's profits, as well as domestic welfare,  are higher in the 
equilibrium where the domestic firm is the high quality producer. 
2. Import tariffs 
Suppose that the government's trade policy tool is an import tariff on the foreign 
firm.  Under the government commitment scenario, the government selects a tariff 
on the imports, then the domestic and the foreign firm choose their qualities and 
finally the firms set their prices.  On the other hand, if the government is unable 
to commit to a tariff, the foreign  and the domestic firm first choose their quali-
ties, then the government optimally sets the level of the tariff given the qualities 
selected by the firms,  and finally firms set the prices of their goods.  In  this time 
consistent scenario, the firms  can strategically choose their qualities in the first 
stage in order to induce a more favorable treatment by the goverment or to di-
minish the consequences from  the imposition of the tariff.  As the government's 
objective is  to maximize domestic welfare, it is  effectively the domestic firm that 
makes use of its strategic advantage.  In case that the foreign firm is the high qual-
ity producer under free trade, the domestic firm has always incentive to produce 
a  higher quality than its rival's whenever the latter faces  an import tariff from 
a  non-commital government.  Therefore, foreign firm  high quality producer and 
domestic firm low quality producer cannot be sustained in equilibrium if the gov-
ernment cannot commit to an import tariff.  The optimal time consistent import 
tariff will induce a reversal in the quality ladder, with the domestic firm becoming 
the high quality producer and the foreign firm the low quality producer. 
On the other hand, if the foreign  firm  produces the low  quality under free 
trade, it will  still produce the low  quality good when it faces  an import tariff 
from a non-commital government.  The imposition of the tariff, however, will lead 
both the domestic and the foreign  firm  to produce lower  qualities than under 
free trade.  In fact, this is  the only possible equilibrium configuration of qualities 
whenever the government cannot commit to a tariff.  As  the qualities offered in 
the domestic market are lower  under optimal time consistent tariffs,  consumer 
surplus is lower than under free trade.  Total domestic welfare increases but only 
2 if the foreign firm is  the higher quality producer under free trade.  This is due to 
a substantial rent shifting effect resulting from the reversal in the quality ladder 
with the domestic  firm  becoming  the high quality producer,  and thus gaining 
much higher profits than under free  trade,  In contrast,  if under free  trade the 
domestic firm  is  the high quality producer,  the imposition of the optimal time 
consistent tariff reduces domestic welfare,  because the rent shifting effect is  not 
strong enough to compensate for  the reduction in the consumer surplus.  These 
results are summarized in the following Proposition. 
Proposition 2.1.  The optimal time consistent import tariff is  proportional to 
the quality of the  foreign  firm,  Sf,  that is,  t*  =  si(S] ~S2)e.  Under optimal time 
5]- S2 
consistent tariffs,  the foreign  firm  always produces the low quality good and the 
domestic  firm  the high  quality good  in  equilibrium.  The equilibrium  qualities 
offered ill the d011lcstic market are 101n:r than under free  trade, and thus consumer 
surplus is 10n'er.  Under  time consistcnt  tariffs,  total domestic welfare is higher 
(lOlver)  than under both optimal prccommitment tariffs and free  trade,  whenever 
the foreign  firm  is the high (low)  quality producrr undrr free  trade. 
\Ve first determine the opt.imal import tariff under the time consistent scenario. 
\Ve distinguish two cases.  First, the foreign finn is the high quality producer under 
free trade and secolld, the forcigll finn is the low quality producer under free trade. 
(i)  UFT-high quality foreign  firm.  Define t  =  ~, where t is  the import 
tariff.  The profits of the foreign and the domestic firm are,  7fl  = Xl  (Pl, P2)  (PI  -
- s2  52. 
te)  - 1- and 7f2  =  X2 (Pl, P2) P2- T,  respectIvely.  In the last stage,  each firm 
maximizes its profits taking as givell the import tariff, t,  the qualities offered in 
the market.  (SI, S2),  and the price of its rival.  From the first order conditions the 
best response funct.ions for  the foreign and the domest.ic firm are: 
(2.1 ) 
Then t.he  equilibrium prices are, 
(2.2) 
3 In the second stage,  the government selects the tariff that maximizes total 
domestic welfare taking as given the quality choices of the foreign  and the do-
mestic firm.  Total domestic welfare is the sum of consumer surplus, the domestic 
firm's  profits  and tariff revenues,  tOxi.  Using  (2.2)  and  (1.1),  and after some 
manipulations, we get: 
iFrom the first order condition, it can be easily seen that the optimal import 
t  'ff'  t* - 51(5 1-52)0  ,an  IS  - 351-252  • 
(ii)  UFT-low quality foreign firm.  Simirariy, if the foreign firm is of low 
quality under free  trade,  the profits  of the domestic and the foreign  firm  are, 
~  - ~ 
7rl = Xl (Pl,P2)PI - Tand 7r2  = X2 (PI,P2) (P2  - te)  - T' In the last stage, firms 
set simultaneously their prices  to maximize profits,  given the import tariff and 
the qualities offered in the market.  From the first order conditions we obtain the 
best response functions, 
Then the equilibrium prices are, 
(p.)2  52  5  (p' -te)2  52  and the equilibrium profits are  7r*  =  ~  - ::J..  and 7r*  =  1  2  - ::2..  'I  51-52  2  2  (51-52)52  2 
In the second stage, the government selects a tariff to maximize total domestic 
welfare, which from (2.4)  and (1.1)  equals, 
iFrom the first order condition, the optimal import tariff is, t* =  5~(51  ~82)0. 
51- 82 
We next show that a UFT  -high quality foreign firm, anticipating the optimal 
import tariff,  can never produce the high quality good in equilibrium.  Let us 
4 assume, for  the moment, that the foreign firm produces the high quality and the 
domestic firm  the low  quality good.  As  the optimal tariff is  proportional  tc~ its 
quality, the foreign firm has no incentive to produce a  very high quality level.  It 
turns out that in the candidate equilibrium, the foreign firm will produce a higher 
quality than the domestic firm which is,  hmvever,  rather low.  As  a result, given 
the quality choice of its rival,  the domesic firm  has an incentive to jump up in 
the quality ladder and become the higher quality producer.  Thus, the proposed 
quality configuration of foreign  high and domestic low  cannot be sustained in 
equilibrium. 
In particular,  given  t*  =  s~i~~_~:~)e,  the firms  equilibrium prices and profits 
become (from  (2.2)), 
p; =  2s 2(Sl  - s2)(2s1  - S2)e 
(4s 1  - s2)(3s1  - 2s2) 
(2.6) 
and  IT*  =  (pj _to)2  5.  and  IT,*  51 (piY  ::l,  In  the first  starre  each firm 
1  51-52  2'  2  (51-82)82  2  b  , 
maximizes its profits  taking the quality of its rival  as  given.  Defining).. =  §J.., 
52 
and dividing the foes,  we obtain the equilibrium quality ratio,).* =  ¥.- =  2.04551. 
2 
Then from the focs  we  obtain the equilibrium qualities, prices and profits of the 
-2  -2  -3 
foreign  and the domestic firm,  si  =  0.12160e  ,  s~ = 0.05945e  , pi  = 0.05291e  , 
-3  -4  -1  - -3 
]J~ =  0.01293e  , IT;  =  0.00052e  and IT2  =  0.00374e  .  1','loreover,  t* =  0.03073e  , 
CS =  0.02215t  and TW =  0.03686t,  However,  this cannot be an equilibrium. 
Suppose that the  fon~ign firm  chooses  SI  =  si  =  0.12160e
2
, Then the domestic 
firm has an incentive to "leapfrog" its ri\'al and produce a higher quality Sh  > SI-
In this case the optimal government's tariff will  be t*  5~(Sh--:t)  and the profits 
Sh- Sl 
(p')  2  52 
of the domestic firm are IT*  = ~  - ...A  where  It  SI. -sI  2 
*  _  3s h(2S h  - SI)(SIt  - SI)e 
Ph  - (3sh __  2sl)(4sh - SI) 
By plotting ITh(Sh, SI)  for  Sit  >  SI  = 0,12160e
2
, it can be easily seen that for 
sufficiently high Sh,  the domestic firm's profits are higher than  IT2  =  0.00374t 
(In fact,  the maximum profits  are approximately equal to 0.0213t).  Further, 
we  check  if the foreign  firm  has incentive to remain the high  quality producer 
by selecting  a  (high)  quality  different  than  s~,  Clearly,  if it  chooses  a  quality 
5 81  < 8i, the domestic firm  has an even stronger incentive to become the high 
quality producer.  On the other hand, the foreign firm has no incentive to choose 
a quality much higher than 8i, since in this case its (net) profits will be lower than 
if it were producing the lower quality good (see below).  It can be checked that, 
for  all these values of 81,  the domestic firm has an incentive to switch position 
in the quality ladder and become the high quality producer.  Therefore, the only 
possible configuration of qualities in equilibrium is  the domestic firm producing 
the high quality and the foreign firm producing the low quality. 
Vye  now determine the equilibrium outcome when the foreign firm is the low 
quality producer.  Since t*  =  8~(81  ~82), from  (2.4)  we  get the equilibrium prices 
81- 82 
and profits, 
p* _  381(281  - 82)(81  - 82)8' 
1 - (381  - 282)(481  - 82)  , 
(  *)2  82  8  (  *  te)2  82 
and 'iT*  = ~  - ::1..  'iT*  =  1  P2- - :::2..  In  the quality selection stage  each firm  1  81-82  2'  2  (81-82)82  2  ' 
maximizes its profits taking the quality of its rival as given.  Defining'\ =  ~, from 
the first  order conditions we  obtain the equilibrium ratio of qualities ,\* =  4- = 
8 2 
38.3633. Then the equilibrium qualities, prices, outputs and profits are: 
-2  si  =  0.250048  ; 
-3  pi  =  0.123108  ; 
xi  =  0.505518; 
8; =  0.006528
2 
p;  =  0.002688
3 
x;  =  0.083148 
-4  -4 
'iT~  =  0.030978  ;  'iT; =  0.000028 
-- -3  -4  -4 
1Ioreover,  t*  0.002158, CS*  =  0.032248 and TW* =  0.063398.  Finally,  it 
can be checked that no firm  has an incentive to leapfrog its rival in the quality 
ladder.  As  a result, this is  the unique equilibrium outcome under optimal time 
consistent import tariffs.  Interestingly, under the time consistent tariff scenario, 
the domestic firm is  always the high quality producer. 
Furthermore, it can be seen that if UFT the foreign  firm produces the high 
quality good,  the imposition of the tariff leads to an increase in total domestic 
welfare:  under free trade TWfh =  0.04475t, while under optimal time consistent 
tariffs TW* =  0.063398
4
.  In  contrast, if UFT the foreign firm produces the low 
quality good,  the imposition of the tariff reduces domestic welfare,  since under 
6 free trade TWf1  = 0.06766t. These results are due to two opposing effects.  First, 
qualities offered in the domestic market are lower under time consistent tariffs than 
-2  F  -2  -2 
under free  trade,  i.e.  S~ = 0.25004e  < SI T =  .253318  and s;  =  0.006528  < 
sfT  =  .048248
2
,  thus leading to a  lower  consumer surplus.  Second,  there is  a 
positive  rent  shifting  effect  due to  the imposition of the  tariff.  This effect  is 
strong and dominates the quality downgrading effect whenever the domestic firm 
switches position in the quality ladder, i.e.  whenever UFT the foreign firm is  the 
higher  quality producer.  If there is  no  quality reversal,  the rent shifting effect 
is  dominated by the negative quality downgrading effect,  thus leading to lower 
domestic welfare. 
Finally,  we  compare the equilibrium outcomes under the time consistent im-
port tariffs scenario and the government commitment to a tariff scenario.  In the 
latter, the government precommits to an import tariff, then the domestic and the 
foreign firm select their qualities and finally they set their prices in the domestic 
market. 
Suppose first  that  the foreign  firm  is  the high  quality  producer under free 
trade. The last stage of the game is  as in case (i)  above (see (2.2)).  In the second 
stage, given the government's tariff on imports, the domestic and the foreign firm 
select their qualities.  Define  9.2.  =  A and IL  =  J...  Each firm  chooses its quality 
s 1  s 1 
to maximize its  profits  taking as  gin~n the quality of its rival.  The first  order 
conditions of this problem call be expressed  as,  SI(\ fL)  and S2(A, fL).  'Ve first 
determine the inten'al of tariffs for  which the foreign  firm stays in the domestic 
mar  keto  Let tm  be the maximum tariff, i.e.  the tariff for  which the foreign firm's 
profits equal zero.  Using the focs  and the zero profit condition for  the foreign 
-2  -2 
firm,  and solving for  (SI) S2, t)  \\'e obtain Slm  =  0.24518  ,  S2m  =  0.074338  and 
tm  =  0.045250,  with the associated quality ratio being Am  =  0.30328.  This is the 
tariff level that leaves the foreign firm indifferent between staying in the market, or 
exiting it.  Hence, the relevant interval for  the import tariff is t E  [0,0.045258
3
]. 
(Note that  fL  =  t =  0  corresponds  to  free  trade,  and in  this case the ratio of 
qualities is  AFT = 0.19043). 
Further, by dividing the foes,  we  obtain an equation involving only A and fL. 
Solving this eqnation for  fL  and choosing the positive root we  get fL(A).  Plotting 
IL(A)  in the relevant  range  of  \  0.19043  ::;  A ::;  0.30328,  it can be seen that 
dfL/dA> O.  Further, substituting fL(A)  in the foes we  obtain SI(A)  and S2(A).  By 
plotting these expressions in the relevant range of \  it can be checked that S2(A) 
is increasing in \  while SI (A)  is  initially (slightly) increasing and then decreasing 
7 in'\.  Moreover,  t('\) =  Sl('\).JL('\).  By plotting t('\) in the relevant range of '\, 
we  see that dt/d,\ > O.  Therefore, as the tariff on imports increases, the foreign 
firm's quality initially increases slightly and then decreases,  while the domestic 
firm's quality increases. 
We next turn to the impact of a precommitment tariff, t, on the firms' profits, 
consumer surplus and total domestic welfare.  Substituting Si('\), i  =  1,2 and 
t('\) in (2.2)  and (2.3)  and plotting we  obtain the following  results.  First, the 
profits of the high-quality foreign  firm,  7rl,  are maximum under free  trade and 
decrease with the level  of the tariff (reaching zero for  the maximum tariff,  tm ). 
Second, as the import tariff transfers rents to the domestic producer, the profits 
of the domestic firm, 7r2,  increase with the tariff and are equal to 0.00330t for the 
maximum tariff.  Third, consumer surplus decreases with the tariff.  Finally, total 
domestic welfare increases with the tariff, and thus reaches its maximum at the 
maximum tariff Im  =  0.045258
3
.  Therefore, the optimal precommitment tariff is 
t =  Im  =  0.045258
3
, which is much higher than the optimal time consistent tariff, 
f*  =  0.002158
3
.  More interestingly, the maximum level of total domestic welfare 
is  Tl¥ =  0.05886t  ,which is  lower  than when the government cannot credibly 
commit to a tariff (TW* =  0.06339t). 
Suppose next that the foreign firm is the low quality producer under free trade. 
\Ve have seen that in this case total domestic welfare under free trade is  (strictly) 
higher than under time consistent tariffs.  This,  in turn, implies that any small 
enough import tariff,  and thus the optimal precommitment tariff, will lead to a 
higher total domestic welfare than under time consistent tariffs. 
3.  Subsidies on the domestic firm's output 
Suppose now  that the government's trade policy  tool is  a  subsidy per unit of 
output of the domestic firm.  Under the government commitment scenario,  the 
government selects a subsidy, then the domestic and the foreign firm choose their 
qualities and finally  the firms  set their prices.  Under time consistent subsidies, 
the foreign and the domestic firm first choose their qualities anticipating the gov-
ernment's optimal subsidy, then the government sets the ex-post optimal subsidy 
level  (given the qualities selected by the firms),  and finally  firms  set the prices 
of their goods.  In the latter scenario, the domestic firm can strategically choose 
its quality in the first stage in order to induce a more favorable subsidy by the 
8 govermenL  Effectively, if the foreign firm is  the high quality producer under free 
trade, the domestic firm,  by choosing a higher quality than its rival's, can induce 
the government to provide a subsidy high enough such that it will cover the entire 
market by selling its good at a  zero  price.  Thus,  the foreign firm,  anticipating 
the government's optimal subsidy to the domestic firm's output, stays out of the 
market.  A similar reasoning applies when the foreign firm is  the low quality pro-
ducer under free trade.  Again, the optimal time consistent subsidy results in the 
foreign  firm  exiting the market and the domestic firm  becoming a  heavily sub-
sidized monopolist.  In both cases the domestic monopolist will produce a much 
higher quality than the qualities offered in the market under free  trade.  As  the 
domestic  monopolist  covers  the entire market  under  time consistent  subsidies, 
consumer surplus is  higher than under free  trade.  On the other hand,  quality 
costs are much higher than under free  trade.  As  a result, total domestic welfare 
is  lower  (effectively,  zero)  under time consistent subsidies than under free  trade. 
Consequently, precommitment subsidies lead always to a  higher level of welfare 
than time consistent subsidies.  Under the government's commitment to a subsidy 
scenario,  the foreign  and the domestic firm  compete by  offering  their vertically 
differentiated goods in the market.  Thus, the market structure is  similar to the 
free trade case, but with the firms offering different levels of quality.  \Vhile under 
the time consistent subsidies scenario, there is  no competition in the market, as 
the domestic firm can strategically induce an (ex-post optimal) high subsidy on 
its output that will  lead  the foreign  firm  to exit the market in the first  stage. 
The domestic finn is  thus transformed to a heavily subsidized monopolist.  These 
results are summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 3.1.  The optimal subsidy for  a llon-commital government is k*  = 
(Sl;S2)S28 if the domestic firm  is  the low quality producer,  and"k*  =  (81  - 82)8 if 
Sl 
it is  the high  quality producer.  The foreign  firm,  anticipating the government's 
optimal subsidy,  will  stay out of the market independently if it is  the high,  or 
low,  quality producer under free  trade.  As a result,  the domestic firm  becomes a 
subsidized monopolist and selects a quality 8d  =  8
2 
which sells at a zero price to 
all consumers in the market.  Total welfare under time consistent subsidies equals 
zero and is 101ver than under both free  trade and precommitment subsidies, 
\Ve  first  analyze the case where the foreign firm is  the high quality producer 
and the domestic firm the low quality producer under free trade. \Ve then consider 
the opposi  te case. 
9 (i)  UFT-high quality foreign firm 
We first consider the price selection stage.  Let the per-unit of domestic output 
subsidy be k.  Define k =  ~. Then the profits of the firms are, 1f1  =  PI Xl (PI, P2) - ~ 
- s2 
and 1f2  =  (P2 + ke)X2(P1,P2) - ¥.  From the first order conditions the best reply 
functions for the foreign and the domestic firm are obtained.  Solving these we get 
the equilibrium prices, 
(3.1) 
and the equilibrium profits  1f* = ~  - 5. and 1f* =  s1(pz+kO)2  - 5..  From (3.1)  if 
'1  S1-S2  2  2  S2(S1-S2)  2  ' 
the subsidy is large enough, the domestic firm's price becomes negative.  To avoid 
this, we shall restrict attention to subsidies such that P2  2:  0, that is, k ::;  S2(~1s~S2). 
In the second stage,  the government selects  the subsidy that maximizes  total 
domestic welfare,  given the quality choice of the foreign and the domestic firm. 
Total domestic welfare is the sum of consumer surplus and domestic firm's profits 
minus the expenditures on subsidies (k71x2).  Using (??), (3.1)  and (??), we get, 
TW =  s1(sIs2 + 2ks1S2 +  S1S~ - 2s~ - k2s1 - 2ks~)712 _  s~  (3.2) 
2s2(S1  - s2)(4s1 - S2)  2 
It can be checked that TW is  increasing in k for  all  k  ::;  S2(~~~S2); thus the 
optimal subsidy is k,*  =  (S1;::)S271.  Note from (3.1)that, as a result of the optimal 
subsidy,  the domestic firm  sets a  zero  price in the subsequent stage,  while the 
foreign  firm's  price is  pi  =  s) ;S2  71.  It can be checked that xi  =  x2 =  ~71;  thus, 
1f~ =  Sl~S?712 - ~  and 1f2 =  S2(:~~S2)712 -~.  Finally, in the first stage the domestic 
and the foreign  firm  select  their qualities  to maximize profits.  From the first 
order conditions,  we  obtain that si  =  0.2571
2 
and S2  =  0.0833371
2
. As  a  result, 
the domestic and the foreign  firm  share the entire domestic market and obtain 
the same profits,  1f~  =  1f2  =  0.01041771
4
•  The question is  whether this can be 
sustained as an equilibrium outcome.  The answer is no.  To see this, suppose that 
the domestic firm decides to choose a higher quality than its rival.  In other words, 
given that the foreign firm has chosen SI  = si  = 0.2571
2
, does the domestic firm 
have incentive to leapfrog its rival and produce a higher quality Sh  > SI?  If  so, the 
optimal ex-post subsidy, k*  =  (Sh  - SI)71,  will result in both firms setting a price 
equal to zero.  The high quality domestic firm thus covers the entire market and 
10 can make profits equal to ~t  by selecting a quality 5h =  FP  (for details see below 
case (ii)).  Hence, the domestic firm has always incentive to leapfrog its rival  ~nd 
become the higher quality producer.  In fact, it becomes a subsidized monopolist 
in the market, as the foreign firm decides to stay out to avoid the sunk costs of 
quality (its price equals zero). 
(ii)  UFT-low quality foreign firm 
In the last stage, firms select their prices.  The profit functions for the domestic 
.  - 52  52 
and foreIgn firm are now,  7fl = (PI + kO)Xl(Pl,P2) - ~  and 7f2  = P2X2(Pl,P2)  -~, 
respectively.  From the first order conditions we  obtain the equilibrium prices in 
the final stage, 
p~ =  251(51  - 52  - k)7J; 
45]  - 52 
...  fi  *  (Pj +kO)2  52  *  SiP;  2  52  and the eq1llhbrmm pro  ts are, "1 =  _::1. 2  and 7f2  =  (  )  ~2  . 
Si -52  52  Si-52 
(3.3) 
In  the second stage,  the gm'emment selects  a  subsidy that maximizes total 
welfare which is  now gi\'en by, 
T  51(35i - 35152 -. k
2 + 2k81  - 2ks2)-02  5i 
TH'  =  --
2(451 - 52)(81 - 82)  2 
(3.4) 
~From  the first order condition the optimal time consistent subsidy, k*  =  (51 -82)7J, 
is  obtained.  Note from  (3.3)  that the optirnal subsidy leads both the foreign and 
the domestic firm  to  set a  zero  price in the subsequent stage.  As  a  result, the 
foreign firm's profits arc negative for  any 51,52 > O.  The foreign firm,  anticipating 
the government's optimal policy, willne\'er enter the market (i.e.  52  = 0)  and the 
domestic firm  will  be transformed to a  subsidized monopolist.  In particular, as 
-2  2  pi  = 0 and k*  =  51  - 82,  7f~ = 810  -%.  Therefore, the domestic firm will select 
-2  -?  - 1 -4  1 -4  8t  =  0 ) and as  a  result,  k*  =  0-,  X*  =  0,  7f~  =  "20  , CS ="20  and TW =  O. 
The domestic monopolist induces a high subsidy on its output by choosing a high 
quality.  As  the price is zero, the whole market is covered by the monopolist.  The 
monopolist obtains high profits,  consumers also  enjoy a  high surplus, but total 
domestic welfare is  zero due to the government's expenditures on subsidies. 
Finally, total domestic welfare under time consistent subsidies is lower than un-
-4  -·4 
der free trade.  Under free trade total welfare is positive (0.044750  ,and 0.067660  ,when 
the foreign firm is  the low,  and high quality producer, respectively), while under 
time consistent  subsidies  total  welfare  is  zero.  Further,  it  is  easy to see  that 
11 any small subsidy under precommitment gives a positive total welfare.  Thus, the 
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